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Appellants' Issues ........................................................... .
(I) District Judge Charles Hosack, who was not the trial
judge, errored (sic) in favor of the Respondents on their
Summary Judgment Motion and entered an Order which is in
error as a matter of law in that Defendant DORSEY was
conveyed title by Warranty Deed from WRIGHTS to all of
Lots 1 and 2 according to the Plat of Steamboat Bay. The
Warranty Deed, Wright to Dorsey has conveyance language
as stated, and the "Subject to" language of the Warranty
Deed is only a limitation on WRIGHTS' warranty(s) of title.
This is the Warranty deed, Defendants' Exhibit "A"
(II) The trial judge, District Judge Yerby, made oral [mdings
of fact and conclusions of law in which he agreed with the
summary judgment decision of District Judge Hosack, which
is in error for the same reasons District Judge Hosack was in
error.

(III) District Judge Verby erred and disregarded the principal
of law that in quiet title the issue is that the Plaintiffs
(Respondents) must prove the sufficiency and strength of
their own title and cannot assert a weakness of the title of the
Defendants (Appellants).
(IV) District Judge Verby erred in ruling that the Plat
dedicated a common use easement for aU lot owners. Even
assuming he is correct in that regard, Harker "reserved"
ownership of this area, so Ross, Brown, and Murphy could

not acquire any right, title, or interest based on the Plat
language.

(V) The District Court erred in fmding that the "use" of
common beach property was dedicated by the original
platting party, HARKER, as common easement. The Plat
itself describes HARKERS' express statement to the
contrary, that Lot 1 included the land from the north and
south boundaries of Lot 1 extended to the Lake Bed of Priest
Lake. In other words, Lot 1 expressly was platted to include
that the District Judge found to be "common beach". There
is no wording of common beach, common area, or dedication
upon the Plat.
(VI) Assuming for legal analysis that the intention of Harker
by the Plat did dedicate an easement to use a beach area
(disputed strip), Harker in the Warranty Deed To Wright
"reserved" the beach area (disputed strip) to themselves, so it
is error for the District Judge to rule that the Plaintiffs
Respondents received any interest in the real estate at issue
by the doctrine of dedication by the Plat.
(VII) There was no delivery and no acceptance of any
supposed dedication of common beach.
(VIII) The District Judge found dedication based on "totality
of circumstances and facts" but did not fmd, conclude, or
articulate what circumstances or facts existed to make such
finding or conclusion.
(IX) Upon platting there was no land "lying between the
mean high water line of Priest Lake and the west boundary of
Lot 1 owned by DORSEY. The west boundary of Lot 1 is
platted to be at the same location on the ground as is the
original 1890 ordinary high water line of Priest Lake.
District Judge Verby erred in fmding what he described this
beach area as buffer strip being a parcel of land not lying
within platted Lot 1.
Respondents are judicially estopped by their own
Amended Complaint in which they alleged the area in
dispute remained owned/vested in the original platting party,
(X)
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HARKERS. Respondents could not be co-owners or cotenants of the same parcel.
(XI) Respondents' Amended Complaint abandoned the
theory of dedication by the Plat, and dedication by the Plat
was not pled as grounds for relief. Respondents presented no
evidence or argument on such issue. The "dedication" of
Common Beach found by District Judge Yerby was outside
the scope of the Respondents' grounds for relief.
(XII) Respondents did not meet the requirements of Idaho
Code § 5-203 or § 5-205 because they were never seized or
possessed of the real estate within 5 or 20 years as required
by law, nor did they bring this action within the time period.

(XIII) The District Judge erred in not finding that DORSEY
has the benefit of Idaho Code § 206, as the mvner of legal
title to Lot 1, they are presumed to be the possessor and the
Respondents never held or adversely possessed the property
at issue. The District Court erred in shifting the burden of
proof on the issue of adverse possession onto DORSEYS
instead of the Respondents.
(XIV) The District Court erred in finding the Respondents
have a use easement appurtenance to all 8 lots.
B.

Respondents' Restated Issues on Appeal.. ............................. .
1.

Did the Trial Court correctly fmd that the beach in
front of Lot 1 was excluded from Dorseys' chain of
title?

2.

Did the Trial Court correctly fmd from the evidence
that Harkers intended to dedicate the beach in front of
Lot 1 as a common beach in favor of all eight (8)
lots?

3.

As a matter of law, can a developer privately dedicate
land for the benefit of all those members of the subdivision or plat?
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Are the Respondents or Appellants entitled to
attorneys' fees on appeal?
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' Brief seems to be more argument than recitation of facts. For this

reason, Respondents Ross, et aI., chose to restate the undisputed facts of the case, as
allowed by I.A.R. 35 (b)(3), as follows:

A.

PROCEDURAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 17, 1966, Mr. and Mrs. F. M. Harker ("Harker") signed an Owner's
Certification creating a Plat for the Steamboat Bay lots ("the Plat"). (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
10) The Plat consisted of eight (8) lots extending from Priest Lake along a shared
"private" road, along the south boundary of all eight (8) lots. For convenience, the Plat is
incorporated herein as Addendum "A". (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10)
The Plat contains language that reads as follows:
It is the intent of the owners that Lot 1 and the 20-foot
private road, as shown on the herein Plat, shall include the
lands lying between the sidelines produced to the meanhigh-water-line of Priest Lake.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10
Four days later, Harkers conveyed Lot 1 to Appellant Dorseys' direct predecessor
in interest, R.G. and Nitella Wright, husband and wife, ("Wright").
The Harker to Wright deed ("Harker-Wright Deed") describes the real property
conveyed as follows:
Lot ONE (1) Steamboat Bay Lots, a platted sub-division of
Government Lot Five in Section 27, Township 60 North,
Range 4 West, Boise Meridian.

It is specifically understood that the grantors reserve, as a
common beach for all owners in said plat, that certain tract
and beach lying between the mean high water line and the
West boundary line of said Lot One. Said reserved beach
being a tract approximately 20 feet wide between the waters
of Priest Lake and the West boundaary (sic) of the above
described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in length.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1
On October 1, 1999, Nitella Wright, a widow, conveyed to Appellants, Tommy A.
Dorsey and Erin T. Dorsey, husband and wife, ("Dorsey") by Warranty Deed, which reads
as follows:
Lots 1 and 2 in STEAMBOAT BAY LOTS, according to the
plat thereof. .....
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2
The record is clear that Harker never conveyed the common beach reserved in the
Harker-Wright deed, to Wrights or Dorseys ..
The Respondent, Larry Brown, owns Lots 3 and 4, Alan Ross owns Lots 5 and 6,
and Michael and Nancy Murphy own Lots 7 and 8. (Brown, Ross and Murphy are referred
to collectively as "Ross, et al.") Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3, 4 and 5.
Respondents Ross, et. al. filed their Compliant for Quiet Title and Declaratory
Judgment on May 26, 2009 and an Amended Complaint on September 15, 2010 upon
discovery that Banner Bank and other lenders may have held a security interest in the
common beachfront property. (R. Vol. 1. pp.II-22, Vol. II, pp. 192-204)
Appellants' Brief spends a great deal of time discussing the Harkers' intent on the
Plat Certificate, but there is little discussion of the reservation of a common beach by
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Harker in the Dorsey chain of title. This issue was resolved in Plaintiffs' favor by
Summary Judgment on April 28, 2010. (R. Vol. 1. pp 136-8)
At trial on June 27 and 28,2011, Dorsey's Counsel called Nitella Wright in the
Defendants' case. Mrs. Wright did little to advance Appellants Dorsey's claim of
ownership to the beach. When asked by Mr. Finney what she did when she discovered
that Harkers had reserved the beach in front of Lot 1 for all eight (8) lots, Mrs. Wright
testified as follows:
Q.
A.

Did you do anything about it?
I think-I don't remember if we talked to Harkers
nor not. You know it's 45 years ago. You kind of
can't remember. I don't remember talking to them
about it. I guess we just assumed that's the way it
was.
Tr. p. 243, 11. 3-8

Mrs. Wright later testified that they were friends and neighbors of Harkers after the
purchase and that Mrs. Harker lived with them for a time after Mr. Harker died. (Tr. pp.
243,244)
Dorsey argued at trial and on this appeal that "no such strip of land" exists and that
the owner's certification on the Plat conveyed all title to the shores of Priest Lake in the
Harker-Wright Deed. However, Dorsey ignores the reservation language in the HarkerWright deed that states Harker "reserves, as a common beach for all owners in said plat,
that certain tract and beach lying between the mean high water line and the West Boundary
line of Lot One." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) The Harker-Wright deed goes on to describe the
common beach by reference to the distances found on the Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots.
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The District Judge found that Harkers reserved fee title to themselves in the
common beach and by the Deed language privately dedicated an easement on the common
beach and road in favor of all eight (8) lots of Steamboat Bay Lots. (Tr. pp. 317-328)

B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondents Ross, et al. filed a Complaint for Quiet Title May 26,2009, and
Dorsey filed their Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim seeking quiet title against Ross,
et al. and Harker on July 14,2009. (R. Vol. I, pp.11-34)
In response to Dorsey's Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, Ross, et al. filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 17,2010. (R. Vol. I, pp.46-62). The
gravamen of Ross, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment argument was simply that
Dorseys held no fee title interest in the beachfront property, as it was specifically excluded
from the initial conveyance from Harker to Wright, Dorsey's immediate predecessor in
interest. (R. Vol. 1., pp 51-62) Ross, et al. also argued that the Dorsey's adverse
possession claims failed to be supported by fact or law as required by Idaho case law.
At the March 17,2010, hearing, Judge Charles Hosack found from the undisputed
evidence in the chain of title that Dorsey had no fee simple title interest in the property, as
it was specifically reserved in the Harker-Wright Deed. Summary Judgment was granted
as to that issue only, reserving all other issues for trial. (R. Vol. I, pp.136-13 7).
On May 12,2010, Dorsey filed their Motion to Set Aside, Alter, Amend and
Reconsider Court's Order filed April 28, 2010, but never noticed the motion for hearing.
(R. Vol. I, pp.139-144). Appellant's brief often references their Motion to Set Aside,
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Alter, Amend and Reconsider, but that motion was never argued or heard by any presiding
judge, because Appellant failed to notice it for hearing.
When the matter first came up for trial in 2010, the trial was vacated when it was
discovered Banner Bank and Bank: of the Cascades were necessary parties as they may
claim an interest in the common beach under a Deed of Trust or other security instrument.
Ross, et. al. fIled their Amended Complaint for Quiet Title on September 15,2010. (R.
Vol. II, pp. 192-204)
Bank of the Cascades was defaulted and Banner Bank fIled an Answer to the
Amended Complaint on December 13,2010. (R. Vol. II, pp. 219-222) Dorsey filed an
Amended Answer and Counterclaim on December 16,2010, seeking quiet title to the
common beach as against Harkers and the Ross, et. al. (R. Vol. II, pp. 223-236) Banner
Bank did not participate in the trial proceedings. The case was reset and heard by the
Honorable Steve Verby on June 27th and 28 th , 2011.
On June 30, 2011, the Trial Court announced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law stating that the totality of the circumstances arising from the Plat executed February
17, 1966, by Mr. and Mrs. Harker and the subsequent Harker-Wright deed executed
February 21, 1966, led to the Trial Court conclusion "[that] it was the intent of the
Harkers to provide for roadway and beach access to all lot owners of the subdivision by
including the language in the Owner's Certification" and reserving ownership and
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dedicating the common beach in the Harker-Wright Deed. (Tr. pp.319, 11.12-17)1
Based upon the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on
the record on June 30, 2011, the Court entered a Judgment on July 26, 2011. (R. Vol. II,
pp.272-276).
Dorsey filed their Notice of Appeal August 19, 2011. (R. Vol. II, pp.277-285).

1 In this Brief, Respondents will designate the Trial Transcript covering June 27, 28 and
30,2010, as "Tr." and the Summary Judgment hearing on March 17,2010, as "Summary
Judgment".)
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Appellants' Issues

Appellants Dorsey state fourteen (14) separate "ISSUES ON A.PPEAL", and
consume a majority of their Brief in reciting those issues and the procedural history of the
case.
B.

Respondents' Issues

Respondents respectfully restate that all of Appellants' Issues can be more
succinctly restated in the following four (4) issues:
1.

Did the Trial Court correctly [md that the beach in
excluded from Dorseys' chain of title?

front of Lot 1 was

2.

Did the Trial Court correctly [md from the evidence that Harkers intended to
dedicate the beach in front of Lot 1as a common beach in favor of all eight
(8) lots?

3.

As a matter of law, can a developer privately dedicate land for the benefit of
all those members of the subdivision or plat?

4.

Are the Respondents or Appellants entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal?

Additionally, on this Appeal Appellants seek attorneys' fees. As indicated below,
Respondents are entitled to their attorney's fees and costs since the issues presented by
Appellants are simply a restatement of arguments made and rejected in the District Court's
ruling.
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III.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

Where the trial is submitted to the District Judge without jury and the evidence and
legal issues require both findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, the standard is as follows:
Findings of fact based on substantial and competent
evidence will not be overturned on appeal even in the face of
conflicting evidence. It is the province of the District Court
to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
Beckstead v. Price,
146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008)
Review of a district court's [mdings of fact is limited to
ascertaining whether the evidence supports the [mdings of fact
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of
law.
Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson,
136 Idaho 814, 820,41 P.3d 242, 248 (20010)
citing Roell v. Boise City, 134 Idaho 214,
999 P.2d 251 (2000) [citing Conley v. Whittlesey,
133 Idaho 265, 985 P.2d 1127 (1999)
In this case, the Appellants' Brief fails to identifY clearly whether they challenge the
Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, though it appears on closer inspection that nearly all
of the assignments of error raised in Appellants' Brief are challenges to the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact.
A district court's [mdings offact in a court-tried case are
construed liberally on appeal in favor of the judgment entered.
It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting
evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. If the [mdings of fact are based on substantial
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evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be
overturned on appeal.

The Appellants' position can be best summarized as re-arguing the positions
advanced at trial. No new arguments are advanced on appeal by Appellants Dorsey and
Appellants Dorsey simply ask this Court to substitute its Judgment for the Trial Court's n
Findings of Fact.
B.

Respondents' Restated Issues on Appeal
1.

Did the Trial Court correctly fmd that the beach in
front of Lot 1 was excluded from Dorseys' chain of title?

This issue seems to be the focal point of Appellants' argument. The Appellants
spend a significant amount of time reciting the procedural history including the fact that
District Judge Charles Hosack heard and granted Respondents' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment fmding that Dorseys have no fee title to the beach area.
On this point, Dorseys' counsel argues that the Warranty Deed conveyed all
ownership of Lot 1 and that the reservation language found in the Deed is "subject to"
language constituting only a "limitation on Wrights' warranty of title". At no point does
Dorseys' counsel explain this point or provide case law to support it.
The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that Dorseys have no fee title claim to the beach is
well supported by the record.
Harkers platted the eight (8) Steamboat Bay Lots in February, 1966. The Harkers
executed the Owner's Certification on February 17, 1966, which read as follows:
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It is the intent of the owners that Lot 1 and the 20-foot
private road as shown on the herein Plat shall include the
lands lying between the sidelines produced to the mean high
water line of Priest Lake. The use of the 20-foot private road
as shown on the herein Plat is hereby dedicated to the
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot be
guaranteed.

Owner's Certification
February 17, 1966
The depiction of Lot 1 shows a westerly lot line which runs parallel but set back
some twenty (20) or more feet from a line identified on the Plat as the "mean high water
line" of Priest Lake. There appear to be dashed lines that extend the north and south lot lines
of Lot 1 to the mean high water line of Priest Lake, but they appear distinctly different from
the solid, bold line which delineates the western boundary of Lot 1, well short of Priest Lake.
Appellants Dorsey contend that the language of the Plat Certificate caused Lot 1 to
encompass all of the beachfront extending to the mean high water line.
The inconvenient fact overlooked in Dorsey's argument is the Harker-Wright Deed
executed four (4) days after Harkers signed the Plat Certification conveying to R.O. and
Nitella Wright the following described property:
Lot 1, Steamboat Bay Lots, a platted subdivision of
Government Lot 5 in Section 27, Township 60 North, Range
4 West, Boise Meridian.
It is specifically understood that the grantors reserve, as a
common beach for all owners in said plat, that certain tract
and beach lying between the mean high water line and the
west boundary line of said Lot 1. Said reserved beach being
a tract approximately 20 feet wide between the waters of
Priest Lake and the west boundary of the above-described
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Lot 1, and 132.87 feet in length.
Subject to: 1966 taxes; timber reservations of record.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1

Appellants Dorsey's contention (unsupported by any case law) that the reservation
language is merely a "subject to" limitation on warranty of title is simply not factually
correct. As seen in the Harker-Wright Deed, the legal description specifically excludes from
the conveyance the beach area and dedicates it to the use of all eight (8) lots in the Plat.
Further, the common beach description in the Harker-Wright Deed coincides perfectly (even
to the length of 132.87 feet) to the dimensions found on the Plat of a beach area depicted as
lying between the west boundary line of Lot 1 and the mean high water line of Priest Lake.
(See Addendum One)
Dorseys challenge the Trial Court's Finding of Fact that the Harker-Wright Warranty
Deed excluded any ownership interest in the common beach area. It seems that Dorseys
argue that the Owner's Certification on the Plat somehow precludes Harker from reserving
title to the beach as seen in the Harker-Wright Deed four (4) days later.

However,

Appellants Dorsey provide no case law or recitation to the record for why the reservation by
Harker should have been ignored by the Trial Court.
Ordinarily a grantee (the Fliegels) acquires nothing more
than the grantor (the Woods) owns and can convey.
Gardner v. Fliegel,92 Idaho 767, 770,450 P.2d 990, 993
(1969) [a footnote sets forth the exception for after-acquired
title as provided for in Idaho Code § 55-605]

II

Harkers specifically excluded the common beach area from their conveyance to
Wright. Thus, Wright had no title in the beach to convey to Dorsey in 1999.
Further, the Trial Court noted from Mrs. Wright's testimony at trial "that she had
actual notice of the language, that is the language of the reservation in the deed, and she did
nothing about it when the Deed was recorded in 1978." (Tr. pp.320,ll.11-14)
The Trial Court made note of this fact because Mrs. Wright never testified at trial
that it was her belief or understanding that she had any claim of title to the beachfront, nor
did she testifY to any efforts to secure fee title in the common beachfront despite her
knowledge that it was reserved from her Deed on February 21, 1966. Mrs. Wright testified
that she accepted the reservation language and "we just assumed that's the way it was". (Tr.
p.243, 11.7-8) Mrs. Wright further testified that Mrs. Harker even occasionally stayed or
lived with them after her husband died. (Tr. p.244, ll.22-p.245, 1.4) Presumably, if Mrs.
Wright believed the beach was hers, she could (should) have corrected that by addressing the
Issue.
The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that the common beach area was reserved from the
Dorsey chain of title is well supported by the evidence at trial including the Warranty Deed
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) and the testimony of Mrs. Wright. This Finding of Fact is based upon
substantial and competent evidence (in fact, uncontroverted). The Trial Court's Findings of
Fact must be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the Trial Court as [mder of fact.
Anderson v. Larson, 136 Idaho 402, 405, 34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001); Beckstead v. Price,
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146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008).
This Court should affirm District Judge Steve Yerby and District Judge Charles
Hosack's fmdings on Summary Judgment and at Trial that Appellants Dorsey's chain of
title does not include any fee ownership in and to the beachfront property.

2.

Did the Trial Court correctly find from the evidence that Harkers
intended to dedicate the beach in front of Lot 1 as a common
beach in favor of all eight (8) lots?

Appellants Dorsey next argue that it was error for the Trial Court to have determined
that Harkers intended to dedicate the common beach area for the use of all eight (8) lots.
Appellants Dorsey argue as follows: (1) that there was no ambiguity in the documents and it
was error for the Trial Court to fmd ambiguity; (2) that as a matter of law, there can be no
private dedication of land citing Coward v. Hadley; and (3) that the District Court should not
have found that the common beach area was an easement since it was neither pled nor
argued.

a.

Did the Trial Court correctly find ambiguity in the
documents?

Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a
question of law, over which this court exercises free review.
Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous, the
legal effect must be decided by the district court as a matter
of law; it is only when that instrument is found to be
ambiguous that evidence as to the meaning of that instrument
may be submitted to the fmder of fact ..... There are two
types of ambiguity, patent and latent. A patent ambiguity is
an ambiguity clear from the face of the instrument in
question .... A latent ambiguity exists when an instrument is
clear on its face, but loses that clarity when applied to the
facts as they exist.
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Knipe Land Company v. Robertson,
151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 PJd 595,601 (2011)
[citing Cool v. Mountain View Landowners
Co-Op Ass'n., 139 Idaho 770, 772,
86 PJd 484, 486 (2004)
In the instant case, there are both patent and latent ambiguities found in the
dispositive documents.
The Steamboat Bay Plat depicts the west boundary of Lot 1 in a dark solid line, well
short of the mean-high-water-line of Priest Lake.

However, the Owner's Certification

contains language that suggests Harkers' intended to extend the north and south lines of Lot
1 to include all land to the mean-high-water-line. 2 This is a patent ambiguity. The depiction
on the map differs from the description in the Owner's Certification. The depiction on the
map also depicts the beachfront area outside and westerly of the west boundary of Lot 1 with
a dimension of 132.87 feet.
When the Plat Map is examined in conjunction with the Harker to Wright Deed
executed four (4) days later, it becomes clear that if, indeed, Harkers read the Owner's
Certification on the Plat and intended to include the beachfront in their original Plat, those
plans changed when the property was sold to Mr. and Mrs. Wright.
The Trial Court noted that common sense dictates that the Harkers realized that all
eight (8) lots would be more valuable and more likely to sell if all eight (8) lots shared the

It is worth noting that even the Owners' Certificate contains an ambiguity in that it refers
to sidelines "produced to the mean high water line". Harkers chose not to use the language
"extended" to the water line.
2
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common road and common beach area and that this common sense conclusion led Harkers to
reserve the common beach area inclusive of the common beach at the end of the shared road
as a shared or common beach for all eight (8) lots. (Tr. pp.318-320)
Although Appellants Dorsey argue that it was error and "legally incorrect to find that
ambiguous language could be a common law dedication", the Trial Court correctly found
there was ambiguity on the face of the Plat (a patent ambiguity) and ambiguity in the context
of the Plat in light of the subsequent Harker-Wright deed (a latent ambiguity). (Appellants'
Brief, pp.37-38)
There is ample evidence and facts to support the Trial Court's fmding of ambiguity,
both latent and patent, in the Plat and Deed. As a matter of law, this Court should uphold the
Trial Court's fmding that such ambiguity exists. Indeed, Appellants Dorsey have presented
no evidence from the record to support their contention that the Trial Court erred in its
Finding of Fact that an ambiguity exists.

h.

Private Dedication.

Dorseys argue that Idaho law does not allow for a private dedication of land and cites
the Court to Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282,246 P.3d 391 (2010). Dorseys contend that
the Trial Court's fmding that Harkers reserved and dedicated the common beach area as an
easement for the benefit of all eight (8) lots is in error, as a matter oflaw.
Coward v. Hadley is distinguishable in that that the case was pled, argued and
appealed as a claim of express, implied or prescriptive easement across an alley that had
previously been expressly created in a 1922 deed until it was quitclaimed away in 1950. The
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trial court fOlIDd against Coward in their complaint for easement by prescription, implication
and express easement. On appeal, Coward asserted for the first time a theory that the 1922
deed that reserved the easement impliedly created an easement in favor of both lots 2 and 11
in a manner similar to public dedication of streets and right of way simply because the 1922
deed referenced or used the term "alley". Coward presented no case law to support their
theory of implied, public dedication, as none exists in Idaho. The trial court fOlIDd that there
cannot be a public dedication to a restricted class of private individuals. To paraphrase, the
court concluded that one cannot make a public dedication and then restrict it to a specific
class of private individuals. It is "all or nothing" when making a public dedication.
Dorseys now argue that Idaho law does not permit private dedication of land. Not
surprisingly, Appellants Dorsey ignore the body of Idaho case law that directly contradicts
their assertion. (Appellants' Brief, pp.41-43)
"Dedication is essentially the setting aside of real property for the use or ownership
of others." Armand v. Opporttmity Management Co., Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 714, 117 P.3d
123, 128 (2005).
In his ruling, District Judge Verby cited the case of Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners
v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 143 Idaho 407, 146 P.3d 673 (2006), which he described as
"virtually identical" to the facts presented in this case. (Tr. pp.323-325, 11.13-15) The Trial
Court also cited to Saddlehom Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d
677 (2008).
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The elements of public and private common law dedication
are the same, requiring (1) an offer by the owner clearly and
unequivocally indicating an intent to dedicate the land and
(2) an acceptance of the offer. When an owner of land plats
the lands, files the plat for record, and sells lots by reference
to the recorded plat, a dedication of public areas indicated by
the plat is accomplished. This doctrine protects the interest
of purchasers who rely on the value of these public areas.
Saddlehom Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer,
146 Idaho 747, 751-2, 203 P.3d 677,681-2 (2008);
quoting Ponderosa Homes Site Lot Owners
v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc.,143 Idaho 407, 409,
146 P.3d 673,675 (2006)
Inexplicably, Appellants Dorsey ignore this body of case law, including Ponderosa,
Saddlehom, and Armand, all of which acknowledge the existence of private dedication as a
means of creating common areas for the benefit oflot owners within a specified plat.
TIle offer to dedicate may be made in a number of ways,
including the act of recording or filing a subdivision plat .....
so long as there is a clear and unequivocal indication the owner
intends to dedicate the land .... the court must examine the
plat, as well as the surrounding circumstances and conditions
of the development and sale of lots.
Armand, supra @ 714-5
The evidence in this case is unequivocal and unambiguous that Mr. and Mrs. Harker
(l) excluded the common beach area from the initial conveyance of Lot 1 to Wright,
Dorseys' inlmediate predecessor; (2) Harkers then reserved that common beach area for all
owners of said plat (the Steamboat Bay Lots) describing it as a "common beach for all
owners" and further describing it by reference to the dimensions and distances found on the
face of the Plat.
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The Trial Court did not err in fmding that Harkers privately dedicated the common
beach for the benefit of all eight (8) lots. This Court, on appeal, should sustain Judge
Yerby's Findings and Conclusions of Law as supported by the record and evidence and aslo
by Idaho law.

3.

Did the Trial Court err in fmding that Harker reserved fee
ownership in the common beach area and thereby creating an
easement for the benefit of all eight (8) lots?

Appellants Dorsey argue that the District Court erred by finding the common beach
area to be an easement interest in favor of all eight (8) lots. Appellants Dorsey argue that the
easement theory was never pled by PlaintiffslRespondents in their Complaint.
The PlaintiffslRespondents' Amended Complaint for Quiet Title filed September 15,
2010, states as follows:
XJV.

Title to the Common Beach area lying between the
mean high water line and the west body (sic) of Lot 1, was
reserved by the Defendants Harker for the benefit of all eight
(8) Steamboat Bay lots as owners in common or co-tenancy.
On information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants Harker, are deceased.
(R.Vol. II, p.l97)
The Amended Complaint goes on to state that there is a cloud on title as to the
parties' right, title and ownership interest in the common beach area created by the
ambiguities of the deeds of conveyance (specifically, the Harker-Wright deed, and the Plat).
The Amended Complaint seeks declaratory judgment pursuant to Idaho Code Title 12,

18

Chapter 10, to determine the rights and interests in the common beach area and further asks
the Court to enter a quiet title judgment as to the common beach area finding that the
common beach area is an appurtenant interest or ownership of all eight (8) Steamboat Bay
Lots. (R. Vol. II, pp.198-200)
In response, Appellants Dorsey filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on
December 16, 2010, stating that the Plaintiffs have no standing, no appurtenant ownership
and no "ownership of a dominant estate".3 (R. Vol. II, pp.224) The Appellants Dorsey's
Counterclaim further seeks quiet title through reformation of the deed to omit or remove the
language contained in the Harker-Wright Deed reserving and dedicating the common beach
area. (R. Vol. II, pp.233)
At trial, Appellants Dorsey presented no evidence to support their reformation claim.
In fact, their witness, Mrs. Wright, testified that she knew of the reservation and accepted it
as being "the way it was". (Tr. p.243, 11.7-8)
The Appellants Dorsey also counterclaimed for quiet title based upon adverse
possession and seeks a quiet title decree against the Plaintiffs!Appellants and against the
F.M. Harker Estate and Gladys L. Harker Estate. 4
Idaho Code § 10-1201 empowers courts of record acting within their jurisdictions to
"declare the rights, status and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be

3 The dominant estate referenced by Dorsey clearly implies their understanding that quiet
title and declaratory relief may well encompass the Court's determination of easement
rights.
4 Appellants Dorsey appear not to have served the Harker Estates and abandoned their
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claimed". I.e. § 10-1201 (2012)
Although the Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code Title
10, Chapter 12, bestows the authority to declare rights, status
or other legal relations, that authority is circumscribed by the
rule that "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a
case where an actual or justiciable controversy exists".
Generally, justiciability questions are divisible into several
subcategories: advisory opinions, feigned and collusive
cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions and
administrative questions.
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772,
133 P.3d 1232-1237 (2006)
Dorseys do not raise any issue as to whether a judiciable controversy exists. There is
no evidence in the record to support any of the categories to justiciability questions set forth
in Schneider above, and there clearly is a real and present controversy between Appellants
and Respondents concerning the right, title, status or other legal relations of the parties in
respect to the common beach area.
As the Declaratory Judgment Act was cited and pled in PlaintiffslRespondents'
Amended Complaint, Dorseys' argument that the Court erred by granting an easement,
because no easement claim was pled, is not supported by this record.
The merits of the District Court's reasoning in fmding an easement bares careful
examination.

claims of quiet title against Harker to the common beach area.
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4.

As a matter of law, can a developer privately dedicate land for
the benefit of all those members of the subdivision or plat?

The record reflects that Harker held title to all of the ground described in the Plat.
In the Harker-Wright Deed, Harkers state their intention as follows:
It is specifically understood that the grantors reserve, as a
common beach for all owners in said Plat, that certain tract
and beach lying between the mean high water line and the
west boundary line of said Lot 1.....

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1
The Court found that Harkers never conveyed fee ownership of the common beach
area after the reservation in the Deed.

The Court concluded that fee ownership in the

common beach still resides in Harker, subject to the "common beach" language contained in
the Harker-Wright Deed. There is no evidence that the Court erred in its Findings of Fact
and the Appellants Dorsey have failed to present this Court with any authority to overturn
Judge Yerby's decision.
Additionally, Judge Yerby correctly analyzed the case law starting with Ponderosa
Homesite Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, as well as Deffenbaugh v. Washington Water
Power, 24 Idaho 514, 135 P. 247 (1913). Also, Judge Yerby noted that the Saddlehorn
Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer states as follows:
Under Idaho law, a dedication, whether express or common
law, creates an easement. Moreover, an easement does not
divest the servient estate owner of title ..... nor does the
creation of an easement divest the servient estate owner of
the ability to transfer title.
Tr. pp. 326,11. 18-23; quoting
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Saddlehorn Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer
146 Idaho 747, 752, 20dP.3d 677, 682 (2009)

The Trial Court correctly stated the law of Idaho thereby finding that Harkers
reserved title to themselves in the cornmon beach area and dedicated the cornmon beach area
to the use of all eight (8) lots. As a matter of law, this created an easement in favor of all
eight (8) lot owners.5
The Appellants Dorsey have shown no error in the Trial Court's decision to follow
Idaho law, as set forth in Ponderosa Homesite, Saddlehorn Ranch, and other recent cases
determining that private dedication results in an easement interest.

Further, Appellants

Dorsey are simply wrong in their assertion that this relief was not pled, since the Amended
Complaint and even Dorsey's Amended Answer, addresses the relief sought under the
Declaratory Judgment Act and Quiet Title Act.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's Findings
and award Respondents their attorney's fees and costs.
5.

Are the Respondents or Appellants entitled to attorneys' fees on
appeal?
a.

Appellants' request for attorney's fees.

Appellants simply site several basis for seeking fees, but do not support it with

5

It should be noted that even if Appellants Dorsey had presented evidence that the

beachfront area had been conveyed by Harker to Wright or Dorsey, that such a conveyance
in fee ownership would not have divested the remaining seven (7) lots from their easement
interest created by the dedication language found in the Harker-Wright deed. In other
words, even if Dorsey had shown that they had acquired fee title ownership to the cornmon
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argument. Idaho Appellate Rule 41 provides procedure for awarding attorney's fees and
costs on appeal, but does not provide an authority to award attorney's fees. Capps v. FIA
Card Services, N.A, 149 Idaho 737, 744,240 P.3d 583, 590 (2010).
Citation to Idaho Code § 12-121 is in and of itself insufficient authority for the award
of attorney's fees on appeal. Capps v. FIA Card Services, N.A ,149 Idaho 737, 745, 240
P.3d 583, 591 (2010).
Citation to Rule 54(e )(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure also does not provide
a legal authority for the award of attorney's fees on appeal. Capps, supra 744.
Appellants Dorsey argue they are entitled to attorney's fees based upon Idaho Code §
12-121, LR.C.P. 54(e )(1) and LAR. 41, but cite no other legal authority and provides no
argument for the award of attorney's fees. Appellants Dorsey appear to argue a statute of
limitations argument under Idaho Code §5-203 and a statute of frauds argument under Idaho
Code § 9-503, neither of which were asserted at the trial level, and neither of which form a
legal basis or authority for the award of attorney's fees.
Simply put, Appellants Dorsey have failed to cite the Court to any authority or
argument for an award of attorney's fees. Pursuant to the Capps decision, Appellants
Dorsey's claim for attorney's fees must be denied.

b.

Respondents are entitled to attorney's fees.

Respondents Ross, et aL seek attorney's fees underIdaho Code § 12-121, LR.C.P.
54(e)(1) and LAR. 41.

beach area, the result still would have been the same .
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Where an appeal has been pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation,
the prevailing the party is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Beus v. Beus, 151
Idaho 235,242,254 P.3d 1231, 1238 (2011).
"An award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to 1. C. § 12-121 is proper only

where this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was 'brought or pursued
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation"'. Electrical Wholesale Supply Company,
Inc., v. Nielsen, 136 Idaho 814, 828, 41 P.3d 242,256 (2001); quoting Stanley v. McDaniel,
134 Idaho 630, 7 P.3d 1107 (2000).
In the instant case, the Appellants Dorsey have simply requested this Court to
overturn the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without citation to any
portions of the record in which the Court misconstrued the evidence.
Further, Appellants Dorsey have asked this Court to ignore well settled, well
established Idaho law on the issues of private dedication cited by the Trial Court in its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without any argument why this Court should set
aside well settled Idaho law.
"Where an appeal turns on questions of law, an award of attorney's fees under this
section is proper if the law is well settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing
that the district court misapplied the law." Electrical Wholesale, supra at 828.
Where an appellant's arguments on appeal only ask "this court to second guess the
trial court's determinations based on conflicting evidence presented during trial", it is
appropriate to award attorney's fees and costs against the appellant for having brought the
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appeal frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation under Idaho Code § 12-121.
Benninger v. Derifield, 145 Idaho 373,376-7, 179 P.3d 336,340-1 (2008).

In this appeal, Appellants Dorsey have done nothing but ask this Court to second
guess the appropriateness of the decisions of the Trial Judges, Steve Yerby and Charles
Hosack. Appellants Dorsey's arguments are essentially a challenge to the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without citation to the record of conflicting
evidence or case law, statute or authority to reverse the Trial Court's Judgment.
F or the reasons set forth above, the Respondents Ross, et al. are entitled to and seek
an award of attorney's fees and costs.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Respondents ask this Court to affIrm the Judgment

of the Trial Court and to award Respondents their attorney's fees and costs.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 2012.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CH~7?

Attorney for Respondents
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I hereby certify that on the 29th day of October, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
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~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Gary A. Finney, Esq.
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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